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Abstract: Two of the most robust results from dynamic competitive models of industrial 
organization suggest that higher sunk cost industries should exhibit (1) higher 
intertemporal variability in the market value of their firms, and (2) lower intertemporal 
variability in the size of their industries. These predictions have done well empirically.  
This paper argues on theoretical and empirical grounds that depreciation generates 
countervailing effects.   
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1. Introduction 
The study of competitive industry dynamics has contributed substantially to our 
understanding of industry behavior and its determinants. The theoretical and empirical 
strands of this literature complement each other nicely.1  An important component of 
this literature is the effect of sunk costs.  Two of the most robust theoretical results are 
that higher sunk cost industries should exhibit greater variability in the value of their 
firms over time and smaller variability in industry size over time.   These results are 
intuitive.  Sunk costs are naturally defined as the difference between entry costs and 
scrap values.  Natural equilibrium conditions require that values be bounded above by 
entry costs (because higher values would provoke more entry) and bounded below by 
scrap values (because lower values would provoke more exit).  These definitions 
immediately deliver the result that higher sunk costs allow a greater range of values.  
Furthermore, higher sunk costs make entry and exit more expensive, reducing the 
amount of entry and exit and the variability of industry size.   
This paper extends previous analysis by introducing depreciation, a phenomenon 
that has received little attention in this corner of the literature.2  On the theory side, the 
paper contributes a formal analysis of the industry-level effects of depreciation.  
Potential difficulties arise because when there is depreciation the value of a firm 
depends on the age distribution of its various capital components.  Under the 
assumption that depreciation is geometric (for which there is some empirical support), 
we argue that a change in depreciation rates at the industry level is analogous to a 
change in the discount factor.  This makes the analysis tractable, and generates the result 
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that depreciation partially reverses the effects of sunk costs.  On the empirical side, we 
construct depreciation indexes from existing estimates of depreciation rates and use 
them to test the theoretical predictions.   
Depreciation attenuates the effects of sunk costs by moving firms back toward 
their initial conditions. This attenuation can be illustrated by comparing two extreme 
cases: the complete absence of depreciation and very rapid depreciation. Without 
depreciation, small shocks are absorbed entirely by changes in the capitalized value of 
existing firms; only larger shocks trigger entry and exit.  By contrast, with rapid 
depreciation, firms essentially start from scratch each period.  Thus the equilibrium path 
exhibits constant market values equal to entry costs and all adjustment is accomplished 
by entry and exit.   As the comparison of these extreme cases suggests, faster 
depreciation is associated with lower intertemporal variability of market values and 
higher intertemporal variability of industry size.     
Section 2 heuristically describes the model that is formally described in the 
mathematical appendix.  Section 3 describes the measures of depreciation employed in 
the empirical analysis.  These measures, constructed from estimates collected from the 
existing literature, are derived mostly from market prices of second-hand capital goods, 
and hence are arguably more reliable than those based on accounting data. Section 4 
presents the empirical findings.  Section 5 concludes.   
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2. Theory 
Let (ξ1,…,ξI) be the list of expenditures on each input required to create a unit of 
capital in a particular industry.3  With ξ :=  Σiξi defined to be the cost of constructing a unit 
of capital and with χ defined as the scrap value of a unit of capital, (ξ – χ) is a natural 
definition of sunk cost. Let λi be the depreciation rate for the i
th capital input.  Assume 
these depreciation rates can be aggregated into a single depreciation rate, say λ, for the 
industry.  Consistent with empirical observation by Jorgenson (1996) and others, assume 
capital depreciates at a constant rate.  Specifically, if new capital (of age τ = 0) is worth V 
per unit, then a unit of capital of age τ is worth V(1 – λ)τ.  In this context, V є *χ, ξ+ is a 
natural equilibrium restriction, because if V > ξ then there is an incentive to build capital 
while if V < χ then there is an incentive to scrap capital.   
This aspect of equilibrium directly generates the first class of empirical 
implications.  These concern the intertemporal variability of firm value.  Specifically, if 
the value of a firm is approximately equal to the value of its capital, then the 
intertemporal range of a firm’s value, denoted R(V), is approximately   
(2.1)                           
 
   –                    
 
 , 
where    is the unit value of new capital at time t and     is the amount of the firm’s 
capital that is τ periods old at time t.  Normalizing (2.1) with respect to labor yields:  
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where R(V/L) is the range of value per worker and Lt is the amount of labor the firm 
employs in period t.  This normalization fulfills two purposes: (1) it controls for size, thus 
distinguishing sunk cost and depreciation explanations of variability from other, size-
related explanations, and (2) with some additional structure, it mimics an investment-
level analysis.  Specifically, suppose the technology is Leontief or, alternatively, suppose 
the technology is homothetic and factor prices are stable.  This implies a constant capital-
labor ratio, which in turn implies that the maximum and the minimum in (2.2) are 
respectively achieved when Vt = ξ and Vt = χ.  Then (2.2) can be manipulated as follows:  
 (2.3)                   
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Converting to natural logs generates 
(2.4)                   
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 .    
Equation (2.4) predicts a positive correlation between the range of normalized firm value 
and sunk costs.  It also predicts a negative correlation between the range of normalized 
firm value and depreciation.  More specifically, (2.4) predicts the following effects:  
(2.5)  
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  >  0   and 
(2.6)    
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where μ(τ) stands for the weighted average age of the firm’s capital stock.  Instead of 
assuming a stable capital-labor ratio, one can assume a stable capital-output ratio, which 
suggests the interpretation of capital as capacity.   Then similar reasoning implies 
(2.7)  
          
        
  > 0   and 
(2.8)      
          
   
  ,  
where S is the firm’s sales.   
 The second class of empirical implications concerns the intertemporal variability 
of industry size.  Lambson (1992, Theorem 4.4) provides theoretical support for the 
proposition that the intertemporal range of industry size is decreasing in ξ and increasing 
in χ.  The effects of higher ξ are intuitive: they directly weaken the incentive to invest in 
good times and they indirectly weaken the incentive to disinvest in bad times.  The 
indirect effect is due to the future protection from entry afforded by the higher sunk 
costs.  Both the direct and indirect effects work in the same direction: to reduce the 
range of industry size over time.  The effects of higher χ are the opposite of the effects of 
higher ξ.    
 The effects of increasing depreciation rates are also intuitive.  They are even more 
readily apparent in the context of comparing the extreme case of no depreciation with 
the extreme case of very rapid depreciation.   In the first case, small economic shocks are 
absorbed by changing market values within the set of values between entry costs and 
scrap values.  Larger economic shocks generate entry or exit as well.  These outcomes 
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can be compared with those of the opposite extreme case wherein depreciation is very 
rapid, market values are pinned down by entry costs, and all adjustment takes the form 
of changing industry size.  This suggests that depreciation rates are positively correlated 
with variability of industry size.   
 Even so, the conclusions for size variability are not as robust as the conclusions 
for value variability.  First, entry costs and scrap values are not identified separately in 
the data.  Second, similar changes in sunk costs, (ξ – χ), wrought by different 
combinations of changes in entry costs, ξ, and scrap values, χ, may not exhibit the same 
effects.  Increasing ξ and χ by the same amount does not change sunk costs, (ξ – χ), but it 
can affect industry size. Finally, analysis of range, which is what is most natural in this 
context, is necessarily the analysis of changes in two distinct points.  The significance of 
these matters is illustrated by the following example. 
 Suppose there are two market conditions, one good and the other bad, and 
assume that they follow an i.i.d. process.  Let π(k,g) and π(k,b) be current profits in good 
times and bad times, respectively, when the industry is of size k.4 Suppose that when 
market conditions change they change enough to provoke entry or exit.  Then in good 
times, which occur with probability ρ, the value of a unit of new capital is ξ, there are N 
units of capital, and  
(2.9)     π(N,g) + δ(1-λ)*                
where δ∈(0,1) is a discount factor.  In bad times, which occur with probability (1 – ρ), the 
value of a unit of new capital would be χ and the amount of capital, X, would satisfy  
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(2.10)  π(X,b) + δ(1-λ)*              =  χ .  
Note that everything in (2.9) and (2.10) is exogenous except the industry sizes (number 
of firms), N and X, which are determined thereby.  Finally, subtracting (2.10) from (2.9) 
yields 
(2.11)  π(N,g)  -  π(X,g) = ξ – χ.   
Now note that increases in λ must induce reductions in N and X to reestablish (2.9) and 
(2.10).  These reductions will automatically satisfy (2.11).  Also note that the effect on the 
relative sizes of the industry in good times and bad, N - X, is ambiguous, and will depend 
on the concavity or convexity properties of π.  Still, the analysis of the extremes 
establishes a tendency for a positive correlation between depreciation and the variability 
of market size, and this can be taken to data.   
 Summary of Theoretical Results:  
 Value Results:                 
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where R(.), V, L, S, y, and k denote, respectively, range, value, employment, sales, 
number of firms, and capital.    
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3. Measuring Depreciation 
 Jorgenson (1996) and Fraumeni (1997) discuss the empirical literature on 
depreciation.  We agree with their view that economically relevant measures of 
depreciation are determined by the workings of resale markets for capital assets. Such 
measures are more likely to be economically relevant than, for example, accounting 
measures.   
We require two different measures of depreciation: a firm-level measure to test 
the implications regarding the variability of value over time, and an industry-level 
measure to test the implications regarding the variability of size over time.   To construct 
either measure requires estimates of depreciation for the capital inputs.  We have taken 
these from Hulten and Wykoff (1981) as summarized by Jorgenson (1996) Table II.  
Hulten and Wykoff apply the Box–Cox power transformation to prices of used assets in  
order to estimate the rate and form of economic depreciation. This allows them to 
statistically discriminate between various patterns of depreciation (such as geometric, 
linear and one-hoss-shay depreciation patterns).  They find that the observed 
depreciation patterns are approximately geometric. In a later paper, Hulten and Wykoff 
(1996) revise and extend these measures to include the effect of obsolescence, defined 
as the decline in price resulting from the introduction of new vintages of capital.  As a 
result, the revised rates are somewhat higher than the initial Hulten-Wykoff depreciation 
rates. The two sets of depreciation indexes based on these estimates will be referred to 
as HW1 and HW2, respectively.  Finally, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes 
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its own estimates of depreciation rates for use in the National Income and Product 
Accounts.  The estimates employed in the national accounts differ from the other two 
depreciation measures in that they incorporate information about lifetimes and salvage 
values of assets and accounting formulas permitted for tax purposes. The economic 
depreciation rates for nonresidential structures estimated by Hulten and Wykoff are 
much lower than those employed in the U.S. national accounts. The BEA depreciation 
rates can be found, for example, in Jorgenson and Sullivan (1981).  More recent, but not 
very different, depreciation rates can be found in Fraumeni (1997).    
We constructed the firm-level estimate of depreciation as a weighted sum of the 
depreciation rates of the capital inputs used by the firm.  The weights are estimates of 
the firm’s expenditures for the respective capital inputs.  Specifically, the depreciation 
index for firm f in industry F is  
 (3.1)  ΛFf = ∑i λ i PiF (Sf/SF)                                                                                                
where Sf  is firm f’s average sales over time, i is the depreciation rate of input i, PiF is the 
aggregate expenditure on input i in industry F, and SF is industry F’s average sales over 
time.  Of course, it would be preferable to have a direct firm-level measure of the usage 
of the various inputs.  However, if usage is roughly proportional to labor or sales, then 
the index will generate fairly good estimates of firm-level use.  For the industry’s 
expenditures on input i, PiF, we used the capital flows table constructed by the Industry 
Economics Division (IED) of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the United States 
Department of Commerce. The capital flows table is a supplement to the benchmark 
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input-output accounts and it shows purchases of new structures, equipment, and 
software by industry.  Specifically, the capital flows table lists the capital inputs used in 
each industry; we multiplied these by the depreciation rates for the respective industries 
in which the inputs were produced and then summed over inputs.5  
We used similar methods to construct our depreciation measures for the analysis 
of the intertemporal size of an industry.  In contrast to the analysis of intertemporal firm 
value, where each observation corresponds to a firm, here an observation corresponds 
to an industry.  Of course, defining industries is seldom without difficulties.  We assigned 
firms to industries according to SIC (NAICS) codes at the 2-4 digit level.  If expenditure 
per unit of output (sales) is interpreted as a cost of capacity, then  
(3.2)  ΛF = ∑i λ i PiF /SF    
is roughly interpretable as the depreciation rate of capacity in industry F.6     
4. Evidence 
 The first regressions test the theoretical propositions from Section 2 that the 
range of normalized firm value is positively correlated with sunk costs and negatively 
correlated with the rate of depreciation of its capital inputs.  The database used for these 
purposes contains information on up to 4628 publicly traded manufacturing companies 
in the United States observed between 1970 and 2008. There is obvious selection bias in 
the firms that survive, but it is of little practical importance because the theory makes 
predictions about surviving firms. Most of the database was compiled from Standard and 
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Poor’s Compustat.  As is commonly done, we measured firm value as the sum of stock 
market capitalization and total liabilities.  Stock market capitalization is calculated as the 
year-end closing price of common shares times the number of common shares 
outstanding.  The closing price is the closing trade price for shares traded on a national 
stock exchange and the closing bid price for shares trading over-the-counter.  We 
measured intertemporal variability in two ways: range and variance.  Although theory 
favors range as the appropriate measure, variance is less sensitive to data problems that 
result from outliers.  It turns out that one may remain agnostic as to which is the better 
measure: the regressions with range and the regressions with variance yield similar 
results.  We normalized the dependent variable and the sunk costs proxy by the number 
of employees and by sales.   
The regressions include both a sunk cost proxy as in our prior studies (namely, 
investment in property, plants and equipment) and a depreciation rate (explained above 
in Section 3).  The results for the complete data set (1970-2008) are in Tables 1 and 2. 
The coefficient of the depreciation rate is negative, as predicted, and highly significant. 
The coefficient of the sunk cost proxy is positive, also as predicted, and highly significant.  
Concerned that 39 years might be too long to expect a firm to remain similar, we also 
divided the sample into ten year subsamples (1970-79, 1980-1989, 1990-99, 2000-2008). 
The results are in Tables 3 and 4.  Our conclusions were unaffected. In addition to what 
we have reported, we tried several other specifications of independent variables as 
robustness checks, including the number of employees, capital expenditures, capital 
intensiveness (as measured by the capital-labor ratio), and new capital expenditures. 
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None of these variants had any significant effect on our conclusions. To summarize, the 
empirical analysis of the value conclusions, which are the theoretically better founded of 
the two classes of results, is strongly supportive of the theory.   
The second class of theoretical results concerns the effects of sunk costs and 
depreciation on the variability of industry size over time.  We used three different 
measures of industry size: employment, the number of firms, and the capital stock.   
Employment variability is the best behaved of the three dependent variables 
relative to its theoretically predicted behavior.  The results are in Table 5.   The 
coefficients of both the depreciation and the sunk cost proxies are significant and of the 
predicted sign.   
The number of firms is another possible measure of industry size.  With 
sponsorship from the US Small Business Administration (SBA), the Census Bureau collects 
annual data on entry and exit by industry for the United States as a whole and for each 
state.7 This database contains information about entry, exit, and employment from 1999-
2006 for each included industry.8  Our data do not include the number of firms.  They do 
include annual data on entry and exit.  Fortunately, this is adequate to calculate the 
range of the number of firms because, assuming there is enough variability over time and 
a long enough  observation period to observe the extremes, the range of the number of 
firms is 
             R(y) = maxτ{yo +      
  [nt – xt]} – minτ {yo +    
 [nt – xt]} 
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= maxτ {    
  [nt – xt]} – minτ {    
 [nt – xt]} 
where nt and xt are respectively entry and exit in period t.  Since the initial number of 
firms, yo, cancels, not observing it poses no problem.  The results are in Table 6.   The 
various specifications all exhibit coefficients of the predicted sign, but the results are 
weaker.  The depreciation coefficients are all strongly of the predicted sign, but the 
coefficients of the sunk cost proxies (capital expenditures normalized by labor and by 
sales), though of the predicted sign, are not statistically different from zero.9    
 Finally, the results from using capital as a measure of industry size are in Table 7.  
The depreciation coefficients are statistically significant and of the predicted sign but the 
sunk cost proxies, though of the predicted sign, are not statistically significant.   
To summarize, the results of the empirical analysis of the size conclusions are not 
as strongly supportive as the analysis of the value conclusions.  The weaker results are 
arguably due to a small sample size.  When the estimates are significantly different from 
zero, they always have the predicted sign.   
5. Concluding Remarks 
 The field of industrial organization began as the study of imperfect competition.  
Differences in profit rates across industries, a very well documented phenomenon, were 
taken to be evidence that competition was imperfect.   However, Lambson (1992) 
showed that differing profit rates across industries are consistent with perfect 
competition, even in the long run. Since maximizing average profits is not the firms’ 
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objective, the market provides no mechanism to equalize them.  Rather, if firms attempt 
to maximize the expected present value of investments, then it is the value of a marginal 
dollar of investment that will tend to equalize across investments.  Under these 
circumstances, it seems likely that any robust empirical implications will be inherently 
dynamic.  This paper has focused on some of these dynamic implications relating to the 
effects of sunk cost and depreciation on intertemporal variability of capital values and 
intertemporal variability of industry size, showing them to be broadly consistent with the 
data.   
6. Mathematical Appendix 
Index the countably infinitely many time periods by the positive integers, t
,1,2,3,…-.  The set of market conditions is M.  A market condition, ,m M  describes the 
values of the relevant exogenous variables such as factor prices and demand conditions.  
Market conditions follow an exogenous stochastic process known to the firms.  Let Ht be 
the set of conceivable t-period histories of market conditions and define H=∪tHt as the 
set of all finite-period histories.  For h∈Ht and g∈Hs, where s>t, let ρ(g|h) be the 
probability that the history g is realized given that the history h is realized.  If g is the 
history of market conditions through time t and k is the aggregate capital stock in the 
industry at time t, then the current profit from owning a unit of capital is denoted π(k,g) 
and can be interpreted as having been derived from the static competitive equilibrium, 
with aggregate capital stock k, when market conditions are described by the last market 
condition in g. An exit rule is a set of nodes such that no node in the set precedes any 
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other; an exit rule is interpreted as a set of nodes that would provoke exit if reached.  If 
the (endogenous) stochastic process governing the capital stock is K = {kh}h∈H, then the 
expected present value of a unit of capital in the last period of the history h∈Ht is 
V(K,h) =  π(k,h) +  
      ∈          
    
              ∈                     ∈      
where δ∈(0,1) is the discount factor, λ∈(0,1) is the depreciation rate, is the set of all 
exit rules and η(γ,s) is the set of s-period histories such that a firm using the exit rule   
would not scrap any capital before or during the period s.  For h∈Ht, let h
-1∈Ht-1 be the 
history comprised of the first 1t   market conditions of h.  An equilibrium is a stochastic 
process K such that, for all t and all h∈Ht,   
V(K,h) = ξ                                           if k(h) > k(h-1) 
V(K,h) ∈ [χ,ξ]        if k(h-1) = k(h) 
V(K,h) = χ                                          if k(h-1) > k(h)  
Informally, firms build more capital only if the expected present value of the marginal 
unit is not less than its cost, and firms scrap capital only if its expected present value 
does not exceed its scrap value. 
 Two technical assumptions are useful.  A1 allows proof of the existence of 
equilibrium by backward induction in finite truncations, simple intermediate value 
theorems and taking limits. The variable φh can be interpreted as a fixed production cost. 
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A2 implies that there is no incentive for investment if there is no possibility of future 
profitable production.    
A1: For all h, ( , )k h  is continuous and decreasing in k with 
0
lim ( , )
k
k h

   and 
lim ( , ) 0.h
k
k h 

  
  
 
A2:  For all t and all th H , ( )V h   where  
1 ( , )
( ) sup [ (1 )] ( | )( ) ( | )
s
s t
h g
s t g s g H
V h g h g h
   
      


     
   
       
   
  
 
The theorem establishes that an equilibrium exists and can be characterized by a 
stochastic sequence of ordered pairs.   
Theorem: There exists a stochastic sequence of ordered pairs, {Nh,Xh} such that the 
stochastic sequence K satisfying kh = min{Xh,max{Nh,kh-1}} for all h∈H is an equilibrium.  
 
Proof:  For all T, all t ≤ T, and all h∈Ht, define 
 ( , )Tw k h   if Th H  
 
1
( , ) ( , ) (1 - ) ( | ) ( , )
t
T T gT
g H
w k h k h g h w k g   

     otherwise,  
where   min ,max ,gT gT gTk x N k .  The pairs  ,gT gTN X  are defined by backward 
induction as follows. 
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 For 1Tg H  , gN   is the smallest value that satisfies  ,gw N g   .  This is well 
defined because by A1 
      
0 0
lim , lim , (1 - )
k k
w k g k g     
 
    
while A1 and A2 imply  
    lim , (1 - )g
k
w k g     

     
  Since  ,w k g  inherits continuity in k from π, gN   exists. 
 For g∈Hg, Xgτ is the smallest value that satisfies.  , .gw x g    If ( , )s H  
(1 - )g       then reasoning similar to the previous paragraph implies that gX  is 
finite.  Otherwise gX   is infinite. Make the induction hypothesis that  ,w k g  is 
continuous and negatively dependent on k and that 
gN   and gX   are well defined for 
sg H  if 1t s T   .  Then A1 implies    
0 0
lim , lim , (1 - )t
k k
w k h k h    
 
   while A1 
and A2 together imply  lim , (1 - )h
k
w k h     

    .  So hN   is well defined for
th H .  Similar arguments establish hX   is well defined (although possibly infinite). 
 Next note that hTN  and hTX  are monotonically increasing in T.  This follows 
because    1, ,w k h w k h    for all k and all h∈H th H .  Then an application of A1 
establishes that hTN  is bounded in T.  So limh hN N 

  and limh hX X 

  are well defined 
(although hX  may be infinite) and satisfy the requirements.   QED 
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Table 1  
Dependent variable: Logarithm of the range of firm values 1970-2008, normalized by 
labor.   
Depreciation Measure HW1 HW2 BEA 
Log Depreciation -0.172*** -0.172*** -0.181*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.036) 
Log Sunk Costs 0.576*** 0.579*** 0.586*** 
 (0.084) (0.085) (0.0834) 
Years in Sample 0.0498*** 0.0498*** 0.0514*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.0039) 
R-Squared 0.452 0.452 0.457 
Notes: N=1,661 industry over time observations. Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust and cluster corrected by industry.  One, two and three stars denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. HW1, HW2 and BEA denote the 
depreciation index calculated from (3.1) for the various data sources.  The proxy for 
sunk costs is the firm’s average value over time of property, plant and equipment.  
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Table 2 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of the variance of firm values 1970-2008, normalized by 
labor.   
Depreciation Measure HW1 HW2 BEA 
Log Depreciation -0.366*** -0.367*** -0.383*** 
 (0.0796) (0.0786) (0.0696) 
Log Sunk Costs 1.170*** 1.176*** 1.191*** 
 (0.160) (0.162) (0.159) 
Years in Sample 0.0652*** 0.0651*** 0.0684*** 
 (0.00845) (0.00823) (0.00756) 
R-Squared 0.451 0.451 0.456 
Notes: N=1,661 industry over time observations. Standard errors in parentheses are 
robust and cluster corrected by industry.  One, two and three stars denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. HW1, HW2 and BEA denote the 
depreciation index calculated from (3.1) for the various data sources.  The proxy for 
sunk costs is the firm’s average value over time of property, plant and equipment.  
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Table 3 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of the range or variance of firm values, normalized by 
labor. 
 Dependent Variable: Range  Dependent Variable: Variance 
Subsample 
Log of HW1 
Depreciation 
Measure 
Log of Sunk 
Costs 
 Log of HW1 
Depreciation 
Measure 
Log of Sunk 
Costs 
1970-1979 
-0.141* 
(0.07) 
0.595*** 
(0.0835) 
 -0.307** 
(0.141) 
1.195*** 
(0.162) 
1980-1989 
-0.118*** 
(0.0203) 
0.550*** 
(0.069) 
 -0.295*** 
(0.0411) 
1.110*** 
(0.140) 
1990-1999 
-0.130*** 
(0.0254) 
0.456*** 
(0.0609) 
 -0.272*** 
(0.0529) 
0.925*** 
(0.114) 
2000-2008 
-0.143*** 
(0.0169) 
0.434*** 
(0.0685) 
 -0.286*** 
(0.035) 
0.902*** 
(0.129) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors cluster corrected by 
industry.  One, two and three stars denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. HW1, HW2 and BEA denote the depreciation index calculated from (3.1) 
for the various data sources.  The proxy for sunk costs is the firm’s average value over 
time of property, plant and equipment.   
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Table 4 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of the range or variance of firm values, normalized by 
sales.   
 Dependent Variable: Range  Dependent Variable: Variance 
Subsample 
Log of HW1 
Depreciation 
Measure 
Log of Sunk 
Costs 
 Log of HW1 
Depreciation 
Measure 
Log of Sunk 
Costs 
1970-1979 
-0.273*** 
(0.0522) 
0.350*** 
(0.103) 
 -0.563*** 
(0.103) 
0.698*** 
(0.199) 
1980-1989 
-0.275*** 
(0.023) 
0.478*** 
(0.110) 
 -0.603*** 
(0.0406) 
0.958*** 
(0.225) 
1990-1999 
-0.296*** 
(0.0271) 
0.308*** 
(0.127) 
 -0.597*** 
(0.0522) 
0.626*** 
(0.245) 
2000-2008 
-0.311*** 
(0.0201) 
0.259*** 
(0.108) 
 -0.607*** 
(0.0391) 
0.538*** 
(0.197) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors cluster corrected by 
industry.  One, two and three stars denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. HW1, HW2 and BEA denote the depreciation index calculated from (3.1) 
for the various data sources. The proxy for sunk costs is the firm’s average value over 
time of property, plant and equipment.   
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Table 5 
 Dependent variable: Logarithm of the intertemporal range of labor, normalized by the 
intertemporal mean of labor in an industry. 
 HW1 HW2 BEA 
Log Depreciation 
Measure 
0.081*** 0.081*** 0.084*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) 
Log Sunk Costs -0.317*** -0.317*** -0.316*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.072) 
R-squared 0.334 0.333 0.341 
Notes: N=50 industry-level observations. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
***,**, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 levels respectively. The 
proxy for sunk costs is the total of deflated capital expenditures for each industry.  
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Table 6 
 Dependent variable: Logarithm of the intertemporal range of the number of firms.   
Depreciation Measure HW1 HW2 BEA 
Log Depreciation 0.212*** 0.210*** 0.199** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) 
Log Sunk Costs -0.132 -0.134 -0.150 
 (0.166) (0.167) (0.176) 
R-Squared 0.227 0.224 0.207 
Notes: N=50 industry-level observations.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  The 
proxy for sunk costs is the total of deflated capital expenditures for each industry.  
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Table 7 
Dependent variable: Logarithm of the intertemporal range of capital divided by the 
intertemporal mean of capital in an industry.     
Depreciation Measure HW1 HW2 BEA 
Log Depreciation 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.142*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) 
Log Sunk Costs -0.023 -0.024 -0.023 
 (0.124) (0.124) (0.123) 
R-Squared 0.226 0.226 0.240 
Notes: N=50 industry-level observations.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. The proxy for 
sunk costs is the total of deflated capital expenditures for each industry.  
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Table 8a 
 Summary Statistics: Tables 1 - 4 Mean Median SD 
Independent Variables    
HW1 0.0665403 6.14E-06 1815.566 
HW2 0.06764 6.04E-06 0.699071 
BEA 0.687839 5.89E-06 0.572084 
Sunk Costs 5.351372 56.72 1.809835 
Years in Sample 18.25 15.00 11.21 
Dependent Variables    
Range of Firm Values 6.437661  229.45 1.933361 
Variance of Firm Values 10.77109                          3.7824 3.782412 
Sales 628.8336 58.86 2564.703 
Employees 3.557827 0.331 20.51242 
Sample Size    
Firms 1661   
Independent Variables    
HW1  0.00002898 9.086E-06 0.00006123 
HW2 0.00002902 8.921E-06 0.00006055 
BEA 0.00002763 9.016E-06 0.00004859 
Sunk Costs 10907.723 7932.7803 8267.9856 
Dependent Variables    
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Normalized Range of Labor  0.174 0.165 0.116 
Normalized Range of Number of 
Firms 
0.00342 0.00207 0.00362 
Normalized Range of Capital 0.874 0.604 0.775 
Sample Size    
Industries 50   
Notes:  Normalized Range of Capital (in millions of current dollars) is defined as 
           
  
. Normalized Range of Labor is defined as 
           
  
. Normalized Range of 
Number of Firms is defined as  
                   
      
. Sunk Costs are measured as capital 
expenditures (in millions of current dollars) divided by the average number of 
employees in the industry.  Firm Value is measured in millions of dollars. Labor is 
measured by the number of Employees (unit=1000). 
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End Notes 
                                                          
* Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Vienna University of Economics and 
Business, Augasse 2-6, 1090 Vienna AUSTRIA, adelina.gschwandtner@wu.ac.at 
** (Corresponding author), Economics Department, Brigham Young University, Provo UT 
84602, USA. vlambson@byu.edu 
1 Examples of primarily empirical work include Deutsch (1984), Dunne, Roberts, and 
Samuelson (1989), Geroski, Gilbert, and Jacquemin (1990), Geroski and Schwalbach 
(1991), Siegfried and Evans (1992,1994), Audretsch (1995), Lambson and Jensen 
(1995,1998), Asplund (2000), Ramey and Shapiro (2001), Gschwandtner and Lambson 
(2002,2006), Disney, Haskel, and Heden (2003), Melitz (2003), and many others.  
Examples of primarily theoretical work include Jovanovic (1982), Ericson and Pakes 
(1989), Dixit (1989), Sutton (1991), Lambson (1991,1992), Hopenhayn (1992), Cabral 
(1995), Caballero and Pindyck (1996), Asplund and Nocke (2006),and many others.   
2 There are, of course, exceptions, such as Kessides (1990), Farinas and Ruano (2005), 
and Ghosal (2007).  Lambson and Jensen (1998) asserted informally that depreciation 
dampens the effects of sunk costs.   
3 Our earlier work refers to firms or plants rather than capital.  When a firm is identified 
with a unit of capital and depreciation is ignored, this is natural.  Depreciation makes the 
value of a firm depend on the age distribution of its various capital units, so exposition at 
the level of those units is more natural.   
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4 This definition of π, where the second argument is a market condition involves a slight 
abuse of notation relative to the appendix where the second argument is a finite history 
of market conditions.   Context makes clear which is meant.     
5 Data for the Input-Output Accounts are here: 
http://www.bea.gov/industry/io_annual.htm.  More specific capital-flow data are here: 
http://www.bea.gov/industry/capflow_data.htm.   
6 We used value of shipments data from the U.S. Census Bureau to approximate the 
industry’s average sales SF.  These data are here: 
http://www.census.gov/econ/census02/data/comparative/USCS.HTM 
7 These data are available at: http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/data.html. 
8 More specific information is at: http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/dyn_us_n4.txt. 
9 Ideally, also measures of other sunk costs and controls for industry-wide factors such as 
demand swings, R&D and advertising expenditures could have been used.   
Unfortunately, no such data were available to us.   
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